Questions remained regarding Putin’s ‘miracle missile’ concerning its speed (is it really impossible to shoot it down?) as well as radioactive emissions (a nuclear jet engine produces large quantities of radioactive substances during operation).

Meticulous American scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology recently built a model of such a missile and discovered that the issue of radioactive emissions has not been resolved at all – radioactive discharge is colossal. Any operations involving such a missile will pose a serious danger to personnel, as well as to military personnel and the population living in the immediate vicinity of launch sites or test ranges where the ‘Burevestnik’ is being tested.

In short, it is, without exaggeration, a ‘flying Chernobyl’.

As for speed, American experts believe that the ‘Burevestnik’ travels at subsonic speeds, roughly comparable to that of a passenger aeroplane. In other words, it is entirely possible to shoot down such a ballistic missile.

So why do we need a ‘flying Chernobyl’ if ballistic missiles can already fly at a similar speed without it? It makes no sense as an additional radioactive threat, because the missile carries a nuclear warhead, the explosion of which would be significantly more powerful than that of any nuclear engine. So, billions of dollars have been spent, dozens of tests involving radioactive contamination have been carried out – one of which resulted in the deaths of seven people, nuclear scientists from Sarov – yet there is nothing fundamentally new about this weapon? Let me explain.

It turns out that the ‘Burevestnik’ is nothing more than a propaganda story, created solely to frighten naive foreigners. But this is no simple lie; it is backed by billions of dollars and the lives of nuclear weapons developers. This should make the whole world even more afraid.

The story of the ‘miracle missile’ is actually valuable in that it sheds light on other episodes of the war against Ukraine that many did not fully understand. For example, for what purpose were Russian soldiers sent in 2022 to the radioactively contaminated exclusion zone around the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station? Let me remind you that the army was digging trenches there and breathing in radioactive dust, even though there was no military justification for these actions.

Furthermore, at the very start of the war, Europe’s largest nuclear power station was captured. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station remains occupied to this day by Russian troops, who are assisted by Russian state nuclear corporation “Rosatom” staff. Military operations are regularly taking place near the plant, jeopardising nuclear safety. And from the very start of the war, Russia has been resorting to blackmailing rhetoric, claiming that by supporting Ukraine, Western countries are increasing the risk of a nuclear accident at the plant, and that a radioactive cloud will inevitably blanket the whole of Europe. This is a civilian nuclear power station – these actions have no military justification whatsoever, other than to expand the scope for blackmail.

In 2025, a Russian drone attacked the protective shelter at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. This is not a military facility either. It is a protective structure designed to ensure that dangerous radiation is contained within the sarcophagus built over Chernobyl’s fourth reactor, which exploded in 1986. Those 40 years old events, I should remind you, are regarded as the greatest man-made disaster in human history. Following the air strike, a six-metre hole and hundreds of small holes appeared in the protective shelter; the Ukrainians spent the whole year repairing them, but never fully restored it.

In 2026, a Russian drone attacked the nuclear waste storage facility at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. Fortunately, it did not target the part of the facility where the waste is stored. And this, too, has no military justification whatsoever.

The overall picture, therefore, is that Russia, in the course of its protracted war with Ukraine, is pursuing a deliberate policy of nuclear blackmail against the rest of the world. What is distinctive is that nuclear weapons are no longer, as they once were, the main component of this policy; there are far more elements to it.

Hints at the use of nuclear weapons – from which there is no escape – have clearly ceased to frighten the enemy. So, what is Putin doing? He is trying to instil even greater fear – with images of crazed Russians breathing in radioactive dust, seizing nuclear power stations, bombing Chernobyl, and devising missiles that spew radioactive contamination, killing their own people. This is clearly intended to make the enemy believe that they are dealing with dangerous scum for whom pressing the red button is no big deal. Putin’s problem is that nobody believes him anymore. And he is not prepared for mutual destruction.

The topic of nuclear energy in Europe has gained new momentum in recent years — due to the European Commission’s desire to end dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, as well as the transition to carbon-free energy. It is not only that Europeans would like clean air, but also that, to prevent the most catastrophic consequences of climate change, greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced to zero by around the middle of the century.

Germany remains the EU’s leading economy, setting the direction for the entire bloc, which is why developments in the German energy sector spark particularly heated debate.

Germany’s last nuclear power stations were taken off the grid in the spring of 2023, having once provided around a third of the country’s electricity. Today, nuclear power has been replaced by renewable energy sources, which meet around half of the demand.

For supporters of a ‘nuclear renaissance’, including high-ranking politicians, the German experience is inconvenient and irritating. How can taxpayers be persuaded that it is necessary to spend heavily on new nuclear power stations when Europe’s leading economy has shut down its own?

Not long ago, the President of the European Commission, the German Ursula von der Leyen, criticised Germany for abandoning nuclear power, and within the country there are right-wing politicians who would like to bring nuclear power stations back to life, but there are few of them.

The previous German government, under which the phased closure of nuclear power stations was completed, commented on the ‘nuclear’ issue on numerous occasions. The Economy Minister explained that this is the most expensive form of energy, and Germany has no intention of squandering money. The Environment Minister explained that the problem of nuclear waste remains unresolved and will continue to be a burden for future generations. However, these arguments clearly have little influence on supporters of a ‘nuclear renaissance’.

A recent study commissioned by the government claims that, in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, nuclear power plants are comparable to renewable sources, primarily solar and wind (onshore and offshore) energy, when generating electricity. One might think, on this basis, that nuclear power would play a major role in the fight against climate change. However, the Öko-Institut study describes a scenario in which nuclear power plays a decisive role on a global scale as unrealistic.

Why? Nuclear power has many other practical drawbacks. First and foremost is the high cost of electricity, which hinders the rapid expansion of nuclear power plants. In Europe, according to the study, this cost ranges from 15 to 19 cents per kWh, and in North America from 15 to 16 cents per kWh. Wind and solar energy are significantly cheaper than 10 cents; for example, the cost of onshore wind energy is estimated at an average of 3.6 cents per kWh.

But it is not only the high cost that hinders the rapid expansion of nuclear power. To significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the energy sector, it would be necessary to commission around 30 GW of new capacity per year, which corresponds to 25–30 large nuclear reactors.

In recent decades, this figure has stood at 10 GW, which was barely enough to compensate for the capacity of decommissioned old nuclear power plants. Such a sharp acceleration in construction does not appear feasible. Even if there were more new projects, nuclear power would simply not be able to play a significant role in global energy production by 2050: the construction cycle for a nuclear power plant may be around 20 years, sometimes longer.

Rosatom’s new nuclear power plant project in Hungary was lauched in 2014, but it was not until 2026 that concrete pouring began for the first reactor. Projects being carried out by Western companies are also facing significant delays. And here it is worth asking Ursula von der Leyen, who tirelessly advocates for new nuclear power plants — which have the highest capital costs of all energy sources: when will these facilities help tackle dependence on Russian supplies or help reduce emissions? In 20 years, 30 years or 50 years — what is the plan?

There is another aspect that receives little attention. Today, around half of all electricity in the EU is generated from renewable energy sources; Germany aims to increase this share to 80% by 2030, and it is far from the only European country with such ambitious plans. Consequently, the question arises as to how renewable and nuclear energy can be integrated into the grid. With a high proportion of wind and solar power in the energy system, rapid load switching is required, something nuclear power is simply incapable of.

In addition to the risks associated with a serious reactor accident, which are difficult to assess in advance, climate change itself also hinders the development of nuclear energy. Locating nuclear power stations by the sea might seem ideal due to the unlimited access to water at a virtually constant temperature, which is essential for cooling the reactors. However, due to rising sea levels and the increasing frequency of extreme weather events, it is precisely in coastal regions that the risk of accident is growing.

If, on the other hand, a nuclear power plant is situated near a major river, equally serious risks arise — heatwaves, droughts and torrential rain could jeopardise nuclear safety.

The Öko-Institut study suggests that, in the best-case scenario, the share of nuclear power in the future will remain at today’s level — around 9% of global electricity generation. But even this will require a significant increase in the construction of nuclear reactors. By way of comparison, in 1996 the share of nuclear power was 17%. The most realistic estimate for 2050, according to the study, is 3–4% of global electricity generation from nuclear power.

And one final point. Even if we turn a blind eye to all the problems associated with nuclear power, print the missing money, take up a flag bearing the slogan ‘Nuclear Power for All’ and hang a drum around our necks, at least one unpleasant problem remains.

Widespread nuclear expansion, in Europe or globally, is impossible today without Putin’s ‘Rosatom’, with its vast uranium enrichment capacity and resources for building nuclear power stations. Throughout the four years of the war, Russian supplies of enriched uranium to the EU have neither ceased nor diminished, reflecting the extent of this dependence — and yet the much-anticipated ‘nuclear renaissance’ has not even begun.

There is not a single country, apart from Russia, that is building dozens of nuclear reactors in various countries with such zeal, albeit not at a rapid pace. It is abundantly clear that for Putin, the key objective is to create dependence on Russian technology and supplies, which translates perfectly into significant political influence. As for (taxpayers’) money, the Russian president has never counted it. Here, for example, an agreement has been signed to allocate approximately $14 billion to Kazakhstan for the construction of a nuclear power plant. Well, that’s peanuts compared to the cost of the war in Ukraine!

The reality in Europe today is that there are at least two necessary conditions for a ‘nuclear renaissance’: making peace with Putin and starting to treat money the way Putin does. Assuming that money is infinite and that economic efficiency is a meaningless concept.

Without these conditions being met, the European ‘nuclear renaissance’ will be limited to financial aid from Brussels to Paris. France, which is critically dependent on nuclear energy, is in dire need of funds to build new nuclear power stations to replace old reactors that will soon have to be decommissioned. These Napoleonic plans cost over €100 billion, and sharing the costs with Brussels is extremely tempting.

And this is not an expansion of the nuclear power network, but merely the preservation of the current status quo of nuclear energy. And France is not alone in this within the EU.

The fundamental problem with nuclear power is that its use is always associated with losses. It is no surprise that Germany no longer wishes to be part of this. The new wave of the ‘nuclear renaissance’ has arisen not because nuclear energy has become cheaper, more efficient or safer than before, but because the system is unwilling to change. It is for this same ‘systemic’ reason that Europe has been unable to stand up more effectively to Putin and the war in Ukraine. However, for now, the ‘renaissance’ exists only on paper. That is where it is likely to remain.

Campaigners and Ukrainian civil society groups have warned that Denmark’s Fayard shipyard, owned and led by Thomas Wilkens Andersen and the Andersen family, is helping to maintain and prolong Russia’s Arctic LNG trade by repairing specialised tankers that move gas from the Kremlin-linked Yamal LNG project.

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Analysis by Urgewald, using Kpler vessel-tracking data, indicates that up to 6 Arc7 ice-class LNG tankers could require servicing this summer. The estimate is based on observed repair patterns, indicating that vessels in this fleet require major servicing roughly every 3 years, reflecting the demanding Arctic conditions in which they operate.

Since February 24, 2022, each of the identified vessels has helped move an average of 5.3 million tonnes of Russian LNG, worth an estimated €4 billion. Across their full operating period, the same 6 vessels have helped move Russian LNG associated with an illustrative TTF based market value of approximately €32.3 billion, or around €5.4 billion per vessel.

Campaigners say repairing them now could hand Russia freshly serviced ships with a proven record of generating major LNG revenues, just as Europe prepares to close its ports and terminals to Russian gas.

Since their commissioning, two European shipyards have serviced the Arc7 fleet: Damen Shiprepair Brest in France, owned by the Dutch Damen group, and Fayard in Denmark. Urgewald’s analysis identified 17 port calls at Fayard and 16 at Damen overall. However, 15 of Fayard’s 17 port calls — compared with only 8 of Damen’s 16 — took place after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The last Arc7 vessel to call at Damen did so in July to August 2024. Damen subsequently decided to stop repairing Russian LNG tankers, leaving Fayard as the only remaining EU shipyard capable of carrying out these specialist repairs. As the data shows, Fayard has made extensive use of this position.

The figures show Europe remains the logistical backbone of Putin’s flagship Arctic project, which he personally launched in 2017 and which depends on a small fleet of specialised Arc7 ice-class vessels to keep exports moving through Arctic waters.

With the EU’s latest ban on maritime services for LNG vessels operating in Russia set to take effect on 1 January 2027, this summer’s repair window may be Russia’s last opportunity to service Arc7 vessels in Europe.

Fayard now faces a clear choice: profit from business that ultimately comes at Ukraine’s expense, or help tighten the screws on Russia’s LNG export machine. It remains unclear how Russia will seek to keep Yamal LNG operating once the full EU ban takes effect, but the Arc7 fleet remains the critical bottleneck.

Fayard is not a marginal actor in this story. It is a major, family-owned Danish repair yard controlled by one of the country’s wealthiest families. According to the Økonomisk Ugebrev’s 2024 rich list.

Fayard did not respond to our request for comment.

Alexander Kirk, Sanctions Campaigner at Urgewald, said:

“The Damen Shipyard has already stepped away from this work. Fayard and the Andersen family should stop benefitting from this business.

“This is not routine ship repair. Every Arc7 tanker serviced in Denmark could help prolong Russian Arctic LNG exports for years and send millions more back to the Kremlin.

“The Andersen family has owned and led this shipyard for more than 100 years. They have to decide what that legacy stands for.

“They can stand with Ukraine, or they can be remembered as the family that helped keep Putin’s gas fleet running in Europe’s hour of need.”

Vladimir Slivyak, Right Livelihood Award laureate and co-founder of Ecodefense, said:

“Fayard should not give Putin’s LNG fleet one last service before the EU closes its ports. If these ships are repaired now, they could later fall into Russian hands as pristine, freshly serviced vessels, ready to keep carrying gas for the Kremlin.

“European shipyards must not help Russia extend the life of its Arctic gas fleet or protect a revenue stream that feeds the war.”

Dr Svitlana Romanko, Founder and Executive Director of Razom We Stand, said:

“Every company continuing to service Russian LNG tankers, and thus support Russia’s fossil fuel trade, is making a conscious decision about what side of history they stand on. Maintaining these Arctic LNG tankers helps sustain the revenues that finance Russia’s war, and as a consequence the death and suffering of Ukrainians.”

“Denmark has been a strong supporter of Ukraine, and Danish companies should reflect that sentiment. Fayard and the Andersen family should not undermine solidarity with Ukraine, and must now refuse to service vessels connected to Russian Arctic LNG.”

Notes to editors

About Damen and Fayard

Previous reporting identified Damen Shiprepair Brest in France and Fayard in Denmark as the 2 European shipyards servicing Russia’s specialised Arc7 LNG fleet.

Damen said it had decided at the start of 2025 to stop repairing Russian LNG tankers. A Damen spokesperson told ICIS that previous repairs had been permitted under EU sanctions legislation, but that the company had decided to refrain from further work on this type of ship.

Fayard A/S is based at Odense Port in Denmark. Fayard’s website says the company was founded by the Andersen family in 1916 and remains owned and led by Thomas Andersen, a third-generation member of the family.

Urgewald estimates that:

• 6 Arc7 vessels are likely to require servicing in 2026, based on previous repair cycle data
• Since February 24, 2022, each vessel has moved an average of 5.3 million tonnes of Russian LNG

• Each Arc7 LNG carrier moves an average of 1.2-1.5 million tonnes per year.

• Using a conservative forward looking benchmark price of €37.50 per MWh, equivalent to approximately €514 per tonne of LNG, each vessel moving 1.2 to 1.5 million tonnes of LNG per year would be associated with an illustrative value of approximately €600 million to €800 million per vessel per year. Across 6 vessels, this could amount to approximately €3.7 billion to €4.6 billion in further Russian LNG value per year, if the vessels continue operating at similar utilisation levels.

Methodology note

Full dataset and walkthrough available on request.

The revenue estimates are illustrative and are based on historic vessel utilisation using Kpler vessel tracking data. LNG volumes were converted into energy using an assumed conversion factor of 13.7 MWh per tonne of LNG, then valued using Dutch TTF benchmark prices as a proxy for market value.

For the historic estimates, Urgewald applies a time weighted TTF based value of €348 per tonne of LNG for the period from 1 January 2018 to 23 February 2022, and €774 per tonne of LNG for the period from 24 February 2022 to 30 April 2026, using the latest complete monthly data available.

These estimates do not represent contract prices or actual payments received, and exclude transport, insurance, regasification costs, trading margins and intra EU resale dynamics.

They should not be read as a forecast of future EU imports, which are expected to be curtailed by incoming sanctions. Instead, they indicate the scale of Russian LNG value these vessels have historically helped enable, and the potential value of keeping them operational through further servicing.

Campaign demands

Campaigners and Ukrainian civil society groups are calling on Fayard and the Andersen family to:

• Refuse all repair and maintenance work on Arctic LNG tankers transporting Russian LNG.
• Publicly confirm that no vessels calling at Russian LNG export terminals will be accepted for maintenance services.
• Stand with Ukraine by ensuring Danish maritime infrastructure is not used to prolong Kremlin fossil fuel revenues.

Let me tell about what I did in the past because this is what I’m going to do in the future and write about it. I was co-founder of one of earliest Russian environmental non-profit groups - Ecodefense - back in 1989 (was in Soviet Union, correct). My organisation was campaigning against dirty and dangerous energy projects of Russian government/big business (nuke plants and waste imports, oil drilling, coal mining etc). In parallel to campaigns we have organised one of the biggest environmental education networks in Russia in 1990s with thousands of school kids and their teachers. Ecodefense became the first Russian environmental group labeled a “foreign agent” in 2014 and, as a result, we went through it all - court cases, giant fines, bank account arrest, criminal investigations. In 2024 the Russian government ordered the court to shut us down.

Ecodefense continues to work, now in Europe, our campaigns aimed to reduce the amount of money available to Moscow for its bloody war in Ukraine. That includes activities against Russian fossil fuel exports and other things. Another target for us are Russian nuclear projects in various countries. Let me be clear - any support you give me here will be used for above mentioned things one way or another.

I’m going to write here from time to time on situation in Russia, campaigns we do along with our European partners, probably post my articles (English translated in case it appeared first in Russian). If you like what I and Ecodefense are doing - please subscribe and support us here, and don’t forget to tell your friends about us.